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Dynamic Cyber-Incident 
Response
Abstract: Traditional cyber-incident response models have not changed signifi cantly since the 
early days of the Computer Incident Response with even the most recent incident response life 
cycle model advocated by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (Cichonski, 
Millar, Grance, & Scarfone, 2012) bearing a striking resemblance to the models proposed 
by early leaders in the fi eld e.g. Carnegie-Mellon University (West-Brown, et al., 2003) and 
the SANS Institute (Northcutt, 2003). Whilst serving the purpose of producing coherent and 
effective response plans, these models appear to be created from the perspectives of Computer 
Security professionals with no referenced academic grounding. They attempt to defend against, 
halt and recover from a cyber-attack as quickly as possible. However, other actors inside an 
organisation may have priorities which confl ict with these traditional approaches and may 
ultimately better serve the longer-term goals and objectives of an organisation. 
Shortcomings of traditional approaches in cyber-incident response and ideas for a more dynamic 
approach are discussed including balancing the requirements to defend against an incident with 
those of gaining more intelligence about an attack or those behind it. To support this, factors 
are described which have been identifi ed as being relevant to cyber-incident response. These 
factors were derived from a literature review comprising material from academic and best-
practice sources in the computer security, intelligence and command and control fi elds. 
Results of a PhD research survey conducted across military, government and commercial 
organisations are discussed; this assesses the importance of the aforementioned factors. 
The surveyed participants include (but were not limited to) respondents from areas such as 
Intelligence and Operations, as well as the more conventional computer security areas. 
Kevin Mepham 
PhD Research Student, 
Defence and Cyber Security Research Group,
Brunel University
London, UK
kevin.mepham@brunel.ac.uk
Panos Louvieris 
Defence and Cyber Security Research Group,
Brunel University
London, UK
panos.louvieris@brunel.ac.uk 
Gheorghita Ghinea
Defence and Cyber Security Research Group,
Brunel University
London, UK
george.ghinea@brunel.ac.uk
Natalie Clewley
Defence and Cyber Security Research Group,
Brunel University
London, UK
natalie.clewley@brunel.ac.uk
2014 6th International Conference on Cyber Confl ict
P.Brangetto, M.Maybaum, J.Stinissen (Eds.)
2014 © NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn
Permission to make digital or hard copies of this publication for internal use within 
NATO and for personal or educational use when for non-profi t or non-commercial 
purposes is granted providing that copies bear this notice and a full citation on the 
first page. Any other reproduction or transmission requires prior written permission 
by NATO CCD COE.
122
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades technology has changed rapidly, especially in the Information Technology 
(IT) area; in a drive for effi ciency and cost-saving organisations and governments have 
become increasingly-dependent upon IT and its supporting infrastructure.  In recent years this 
transformation has also led to an increasing dependence upon the Internet by critical or important 
infrastructure. However, the other side of the coin is that this evolution has led to an increased 
exposure to exploitation or compromise by those with hostile intent as traditionally closed 
networks or systems have become more accessible.  Despite this rapidly-evolving environment 
and associated risks, to all intents and purposes standard computer security incident response 
models, have remained largely unchanged since the 1990s.  Furthermore, much of the research 
which contributed to the production or revision of these models has been called into question. 
In a review of 90 works which claimed to employ quantifi ed investigation and analysis of 
security, it was discovered that the validity of the majority of these works was questionable 
when used in the perspective of an operational setting (Verendel, 2009).
This research investigates factors which may infl uence Cyber-Incident Response from the 
perspective of a wider-affected audience in order to produce a more dynamic and stakeholder-
independent Cyber Incident Response model.  It attempts to do this by taking into account the 
strategic and wider priorities of an organisation and also considers intelligence gathering and 
sharing priorities as part of incident response.  Although not yet at an experimental stage in 
the research, evaluation of the identifi ed factors by international communities from within and 
outside the core Cyber-Security areas have already confi rmed the requirement for changes to 
the current models.  This has been deduced from both discussion and by the statistical analysis 
of their responses collected as part of a research survey discussed in this paper.  
2. RELATED WORK
As part of the research, a cross-domain literature review was carried out; this covered not only 
the core CIS/Cyber Security fi eld but also areas such as Military Intelligence, Command and 
Control (C2) and Human Factors issues.  The aim of this review was to identify signifi cant 
independent variables defi ning the problem domain of Cyber Incident Response including 
parallels from other domains outside of the Cyber Security fi eld.  In parallel to the literature 
review, participation in Multi-National Experiment 7 (MNE7), an experiment intended to 
capture the important factors related to preservation of access to the Global Commons (air, sea, 
space and cyber), led to the identifi cation of factors deemed to infl uence the effectiveness of 
Cyber Situational Awareness; a key component of effective Cyber Incident Response.
Situational awareness and decision-making aspects of incident response are examined as well 
as other factors such as intelligence value, intelligence gathering, asset value, collaboration and 
Intelligence Cycle factors.  
Keywords: Cyber Incident Response Active Passive Risk
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A. Literature Review
The literature review was approached from two perspectives.  The fi rst was a practitioner’s 
perspective looking at the best-practice documents from Cyber Security and associated fi elds. 
The second was the academic perspective where research was already busy identifying gaps 
and shortcomings within the fi eld.  Both of these perspectives were then drawn together to 
identify a consolidated list of the existing factors infl uencing Cyber Incident Response as well 
as missing factors which could be utilized in future models.  These perspectives and factors are 
described in the subsequent paragraphs.
Traditional cyber incident response, even from the early days of widespread computer use, 
tended to take an approach of detecting an incident and then trying to halt, contain or mitigate 
it followed by a recovery phase to restore normal operation.  Post-incident analysis was then 
used to identify potential improvements to the infrastructure and processes (if necessary).  This 
approach is best illustrated utilising the SANS Institute Model (Northcutt, 2003) which added 
more detail to the cycle in 2003 (Figure 1).
FIGURE 1 - SANS INSTITUTE INCIDENT RESPONSE CYCLE 2003 (NORTHCUTT, 2003)
Although some evolution has taken place, even the most recent iterations of the best-practice 
processes still broadly cover the same issues, for example the latest guidance (Cichonski, Millar, 
Grance, & Scarfone, 2012) published by NIST (Figure 2), establishes the incident response 
process as an inner circle with “lessons learned” (post-incident activity) providing the feedback 
to improve the infrastructure and processes (preparation).
FIGURE 2 - NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-61 INCIDENT HANDLING PROCESS (CICHONSKI, 
MILLAR, GRANCE, & SCARFONE, 2012)
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This perspective is also echoed in international standards, for example the international 
Information Security Management standard ISO27001 advocates the Deming Cycle (Calder 
& Watkins, 2008).  This standard advises that Information Security (and consequently 
Cyber-Security) can be divided into the phases of Plan, Do, Check and Act.  Within the live 
incident response environment this is reduced to the “Do”, deploy the sensors and implement 
planned measures; “Check”, look for incidents by monitoring the information sources that 
have been deployed; Act, respond to detected incidents or identifi ed shortcomings.  Outside 
of this shortened cycle the planning takes place to improve the longer term protection of the 
information and infrastructure.  However, all of these cycles are based around the core tenets 
of preserving the Confi dentiality, Integrity and Availability of these protected assets.  Whilst 
understandable from a Cyber Defence perspective, there are also other communities impacted 
by Cyber Incidents.  
Looking at cyber incidents from a Military/Business Intelligence perspective, the Intelligence 
Cycle lens can be applied. The Intelligence Cycle (MoD, UK, 2011) has some similarities to 
the traditional Incident Response cycles (commonly having the phases Planning and Direction, 
Collection, Analysis or Processing and Dissemination), however, there are also some contrasts. 
Intelligence work by its nature is designed to gather information about potential adversaries as 
well as understanding this in the context of own and partner capabilities and objectives; as Sun 
Tzu (Tzu, 2011) is reputed to have stated “know the enemy and know yourself, in a hundred 
battles you will never be in peril”. This emphasis on “knowledge of the enemy” puts the 
Intelligence community at odds with the Cyber-Defence community as Intelligence gathering 
is not a natural partner of preserving Confi dentiality.  However, this is not an insurmountable 
problem providing that the priorities can be put in context as will be discussed later.
In the UK, joint doctrine (MoD, UK, 2011) talks about “Inform”, which is defi ned as “the ability 
to collect, analyse, manage and exploit information and intelligence to enable information 
and decision superiority” i.e. this equates to the “Disseminate” of the Intelligence Cycle.  In 
traditional Cyber-Incident Response the collection and analysis is only traditionally carried out 
up to the point where the incident is thwarted and in the post-incident analysis; at this point the 
incident has been resolved or averted and there is nothing more to gain in terms of intelligence 
value (or to disseminate in order to improve infrastructure or intelligence).  Combined with the 
increasing diffi culty of maintaining a credible honeynet or honeypot solution (Rowe, 2006); 
(Wang, Wu, Cunningham, & Zou, 2010) where information has traditionally been gathered to 
provide Cyber intelligence, this leads to the danger of information starvation for those trying to 
assess some of the key Cyber Intelligence requirements such as attacker identity, motivation, 
ultimate target, attack methods, attacking resources, attack goal.  The lack of this type of 
intelligence (especially for novel attacks or unknown attackers) will undoubtedly lead to a 
reduced ability to defend in the longer term.  
With reference to Situational Awareness, this requirement for Cyber-Intelligence is indirectly 
reinforced by Endsley’s model (Endsley, 1995); in this model “Long term memory stores” 
are seen to inform “expectations”.   In turn expectations inform the three identifi ed stages 
of situational awareness: perception, comprehension and projection.  This approach infers 
that without the information (or intelligence) in the long term memory stores the expectations 
will not be optimally informed, thereby depriving the decision maker of the best situational 
awareness.  This introduces the concept of not only utilising static intelligence but also using 
this to predict future events to enhance decision-making.  
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Taking this prediction thread further, as early as 2000, the importance of usable intelligence 
in a cyber-environment was recognised (Yuill, et al., 2000).  In this research a military 
intelligence type process to enhance the effectiveness of intrusion detection and the subsequent 
incident response was proposed.  At that time, prior to the introduction of the SEI State of 
the Practice process (Killcrece, Kossakowski, Ruefl e, & Zajicek, 2003), Yuill et al considered 
standard incident-response process to be attack repair, neutralization and containment (ARNC). 
However, by providing positive identifi cation of the attacker (using part of a proposed technique 
referred to as Cyber-Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (C-IPB)), likely compromised 
devices (LCDs) could also be identifi ed based on models of the attacker and the infrastructure. 
This information could then be used to produce two types of estimate for Courses of Action 
(COA) by the attacker: possible and likely i.e. the notion of predicting cyber-incident progress 
was proposed.  From these estimates, further monitoring could be more targeted and incident-
response measures more relevant.  The C-IPB process is summarised in four steps: defi ne 
the battlespace (defi ne the boundaries of the infrastructure), describe the battlespace effects 
(evaluate the infrastructure and its infl uence on attack and defence), evaluate the threat (assess 
attacker capabilities and intent) and determine the threat’s COA and infrastructure LCDs.  At 
that time, the cyber-intelligence was broken down into: what the attacker has done (executed 
action), capabilities, personal traits and intentions. However, whilst the principles remain sound 
there has been signifi cant development in the types of information that are relevant to capturing 
threats and attacks such as those described in the Structured Threat Information eXpression 
(STIX) community-driven standard (Barnum, 2012) maintained by MITRE Corporation.  This 
standard is directly related to another standard maintained by MITRE Corporation, Trusted 
Automated Exchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) which is designed to allow collaboration 
between Cyber-entities to exchange threat intelligence.
FIGURE 3 - MITRE CORPORATION STRUCTURED THREAT INFORMATION EXPRESSION (STIX) 
(BARNUM, 2012)
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STIX, provides identifi cation of each of the information components illustrated in Figure 3 by 
a number of variables.  Utilising these it attempts to achieve the following four use case goals: 
analyse cyber threats; specify indicator patterns for cyber threats; manage cyber response threat 
activities and the sharing of cyber-threat information.
The combination of several elements from the approaches in the previous paragraphs can also 
be found in a NATO framework document (Hallingstad & Dandurand, 2011) this document 
(produced with cooperation from several NATO member nations participating in a NATO-led 
research task group) is summarised in a top-level diagram (Figure 4) which also includes the 
incident-response processes.  This framework was broad enough to cover areas of interest, not 
only to the Cyber-Defence community but also for senior decision makers and Intelligence 
community.    Whilst explaining the more obvious issues of making sure that the appropriate 
sensors and trained personnel are in place to allow incidents to be detected, it also covered 
areas such as ensuring that risks are owned and managed and that trustworthiness of hardware, 
personnel and partners is addressed.  Interestingly, the quandary of whether to stop interesting 
attacks or to monitor them to gain intelligence is also discussed briefl y within the document. 
Information sharing with regard to CIS security incidents is also identifi ed as a relevant 
issue in this framework; the importance of this is confi rmed by the international work that 
has taken place in recent years such as Multi-National Experiment 7 – Access to the Global 
Commons (MNE7), and continues to take place at the moment in the Multinational Capability 
Development Campaign (MCDC) Cyber Implications for Combined Operational Access 
(CICOA) 2013-2014.
 
FIGURE 4 - NC3A CIS SECURITY FRAMEWORK
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Ultimately, whichever response is chosen to a cyber-incident by the empowered decision-
maker, it has to be timely enough to be able to infl uence the outcome.  This is best summarised 
by the model proposed by Colonel John Boyd USAF (Orr, 1983).  The model of Observe 
(monitor the enemy’s actions), Orient (work out possible actions and consequences based on the 
observations of the enemy and knowledge of your own capabilities), Decide (choose a course of 
action), Act (carry it out), otherwise known as the OODA loop was designed to describe how to 
gain superiority in air combat.  By completing an OODA loop more quickly than an adversary, 
the adversary would not be able to react in time to gain air superiority.  In Figure 5, this is shown 
as not only a single uni-directional loop (as illustrated by several interpretations of the model), 
but also a series of inner feedback loops which infl uence the observation and consequently 
orientation, decision-making and subsequent action.  Although originally intended to refl ect air 
combat, it has since been recognised that this has wider application for strategy in both military 
and commercial contexts. This is also pertinent in the context of Cyber-Incident response 
where, for the advanced attacker, they are often able to respond quickly to any mitigation or 
actions carried out by the defender. If this response is achieved inside the defending OODA 
loop they then gain “cyber superiority”.
 
FIGURE 5 - COLONEL JOHN BOYD USAF’S OODA LOOP (ORR, 1983)
A further development of the OODA loop was proposed to describe a Command, Control, 
Communication and Intelligence (C3I) model (Figure 6) which explicitly includes a simulation/
prediction function (Lawson, 1980). 
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FIGURE 6 - C3I PROCESS MODEL (LAWSON, 1980)
In this model, the Intelligence aspect can be seen on the left hand side of the model (with 
Delta T representing a time difference) and the Command and Control (C2) aspect on the right 
(the communication would be in the sensing and dissemination).  Effectively, this creates two 
unidirectional OODA loops, one for Intelligence and one for C2 (although the right-hand side 
could also be representative of the conventional incident-response cycle.  In the right-hand side, 
‘sense’ equates to ‘observe’; ‘process’ and ‘compare’ equate to ‘orient(ate)’ the current situation 
compared to the desired situation; ‘decide’ and ‘act’ then infl uence the environment which is 
then reassessed.  In the left-hand loop (which feeds into the decision-making process of the 
right-hand loop), analysis is carried out with respect to time which allows some prediction 
of the direction of the environment; this is then fed into the decision-making to allow more 
informed actions to be taken rather than relying upon a static snapshot of the environment.
However, in the context of cyber-incident response, the “Desired State” could be replaced 
with “normal” state to refl ect normal infrastructure operation whilst the left-hand side assesses 
whether the environment is moving away from or towards this state over time.  This is a 
good demonstration of situational awareness; if used in a military decision-making process, 
the sensors would provide Intelligence information (rather than data) which is then used with 
expert knowledge or systems to provide a prediction of the future infrastructure state based on 
monitored behaviour over time.  
Ultimately, the literature review confi rmed that Cyber-Intelligence is an essential aspect of 
Cyber-Incident response; modelling of cyber-incidents to provide prediction/projection of the 
future path of an incident is also important in providing optimal situational awareness and 
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that different stakeholders impacted by a cyber-incident can have a different perception of the 
priorities which may not be aligned with organisational goals.  When combining these fi ndings 
with established models from other areas such as the Command and Control and Intelligence 
areas it can be surmised that further evolution of Cyber Incident Response is necessary to best 
serve organisational aims.
B. Contribution of MNE7 to this Research
As previously mentioned, the MNE7 Campaign was conducted at the same time that the literature 
review was carried out.  This experiment brought together a rare collection of professionals 
from governmental, military, commercial and academic areas from both inside and outside 
the core cyber security areas.  Participation in the collaborative cyber-situational awareness 
track allowed the opinions of an expert community to be gauged and the same community 
also provided signifi cant feedback on the pilot questionnaire, where the water was being tested 
with regard to potential gaps in the existing Cyber Incident Response models and processes. 
However, one of the strongest messages to come across from this community is that everybody 
can see the benefi ts of collaborating by sharing incident information, but in practice they are 
reluctant to do it.  Despite this, given trustworthy fi ltering of information and a mechanism 
to establish suffi cient trust between partners, collaboration can prove invaluable in enhancing 
situational awareness.  In the context of this research, information received from collaboration 
is viewed as one of many information sources.
3. METHODOLOGY
A limited pilot survey was carried out with participants from international military, commercial 
and governmental cyber security communities to evaluate the initially identifi ed variables 
from the communities and the literature review.  Utilising principal component analysis and 
Varimax rotation (described in more detail later) an initial attempt was made to group some 
of the identifi ed factors.  Whilst not strictly observing the identifi ed grouping, as the results 
were not statistically signifi cant at that time (due to the sample size) this provided a suitable 
discussion point within these communities to sharpen the areas of focus for the remaining 
portion of the literature review and subsequent surveys.  However, this focusing of the initial 
evaluation of these variables, discussions within expert communities and the remainder of the 
initial literature review led to the production of an initial model which has also been used as a 
starting point to describe the contribution of cyber to the operational planning process by the 
technical strand of MCDC-CICOA.  
This initial model shown in Figure 7 (which combines process, functions and infrastructure) 
attempted to describe the interaction between infrastructure and what is described here as 
static situational awareness i.e. the impact of an incident on the defending environment as 
it is now, utilising the existing intelligence.  This static situational awareness is then used as 
an input to dynamic risk and value assessment, where, based on the current known situation, 
modelling of an attack is attempted.  This utilises the known vulnerabilities and paths through 
the infrastructure with the available attack intelligence which is then combined with the 
assessments by the different stakeholders for that point in time of the value of the threatened 
assets (recognising that different stakeholders may well place different priorities on the same 
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asset).  The output of this process would be “balance of equities” information to be provided 
to the key decision maker together with the static situational awareness in order to provide 
them with enhanced situational awareness.  This information would allow them to choose the 
optimum response in order to meet the organisational goals; examples of these described by the 
response options (without reference to legal constraints) are to defend the attacked assets via 
passive means, gather more intelligence about an attack or attacker (via passive means) or use 
active means to pacify attacker infrastructure or gather more intelligence about the attacker. 
Referring back to the OODA loop, this whole process needs to be completed before the attacker 
has a chance to detect and respond to any actions taken by the defenders in order to gain an 
advantage over the attacker.
FIGURE 7 - INITIAL MODEL
Utilising this initial model and the literature review as a starting point, a new large-scale survey 
was produced to evaluate the importance of identifi ed factors in providing effective Cyber-
Incident Response; this not only included respondents from the Cyber-Security communities, 
but also other communities involved with and impacted by cyber-incidents such as Military/
Business Intelligence, Operations, Communications Information Systems Management and 
other support areas.  The questions assessed not only the opinions of the participants as to 
the importance of the identifi ed factors affecting cyber incident response but also how these 
factors were viewed in their communities and organisations.  The survey was conducted using a 
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7-point Likert scale for each of the assessed variables in order to achieve an appropriate degree 
of granularity in the results; to date, a combined total of 186 professionals from the identifi ed 
communities have participated in the survey.
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
From the results to date, there has been a striking difference in opinion between individuals 
in all communities and their perception of their organisations’ opinions.  This assessment was 
confi rmed by paired t-tests where all 30 variables were found to have signifi cant results.  From 
the results it appears that individuals across the communities tend to place more importance on 
the identifi ed factors than their organisations or communities.  A good example of this can be 
seen in the response to Confi guration Management (CM) where almost half of the participants 
assessed that effective CM was essential to provide optimal Cyber-Incident Response (Figure 
8) whereas in their communities and organisations just over 10% of the participants (Figure 
9) believed that their communities and organisations found CM to be essential.  Other notable 
examples of this phenomenon were refl ected in the use of automatic tools for intelligent data 
reduction, sensors for monitoring at all levels, timeliness and reliability of data and to a lesser 
extent areas such as environmental conditions that analysts work in.
 
FIGURE 8 – CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSE  
FIGURE 9 – CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT: ORGANISATION RESPONSE
As expected, there are also signifi cant differences in the importance placed on assigning 
a value to intelligence regarding the attackers and attacks between the communities.  This 
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is demonstrated below in the contrasting opinions on the importance of placing a value on 
Intelligence information as part of the Cyber-Incident response process (Figures 10 and 11).
 
FIGURE 10 - IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE: INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS
FIGURE 11 - IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE: IA/SECURITY PROFESSIONALS
However, some unexpected differences of opinion were also identifi ed across the communities, 
even relating to the importance of stakeholders being able to assess the value of assets from 
different perspectives (Figures 12 to 15).  In this example, it might be assumed that the CIS/
Engineering communities believe that they already know the priority of the assets that they 
maintain so it is not essential to have the functional owner’s perspective. 
 
FIGURE 12 - IMPORTANCE OF ASSESSING STAKEHOLDER VALUES: IA/SECURITY COMMUNITY 
 
FIGURE 13 - IMPORTANCE OF ASSESSING STAKEHOLDER VALUES: OPERATIONS COMMUNITY
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FIGURE 14 - IMPORTANCE OF ASSESSING STAKEHOLDER VALUES: 
IT/ENGINEERING COMMUNITY  
FIGURE 15 - IMPORTANCE OF ASSESSING STAKEHOLDER VALUES: INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
However, when the survey was initially produced, a set of 30 variables were identifi ed which 
might be considered important to Cyber Incident Response and as can be seen from the draft 
model, this creates an almost unmanageable model from a conceptual point of view.  In order 
to simplify this, a series of statistical processes were run to try and reduce the number of 
variables (i.e. to check for signifi cant correlation between similar factors in order to merge 
them as a single variable) and these are summarised in the subsequent tables.  Not only does 
this allow simplifi cation of the model but also makes experimentation more realistic (as too 
many variables will make it almost impossible to test all inter-relationships and assess their 
signifi cance on the measured output variables).
For the fi rst time (as far as can be determined) factor analysis was carried out to determine key 
areas of importance in the cyber incident response process.  This was achieved by analysing 
the results obtained from the communities of interest (from the survey) using principal axis 
factoring and Varimax1 rotation. This dimension reduction process allows correlated variables 
to be grouped into common components or factors and those which are orthogonal to them are 
grouped into separate factors.  From the sample size, it is suggested (Hair, Black, Babin, & 
Anderson, 2014) that a factor loading of more than 0.50 be used in order to achieve power level 
of 80%.  Utilising this process (using the SPSS software package), the following factors were 
identifi ed from the data sources:
i) Sensors (monitoring of operating system logs, network sensor logs, application logs 
etc).
ii) Collaboration (both inbound and outbound SA collaboration with trusted partners).
iii) Information Credibility (accuracy, timeliness and reliability of information).
 1  Created by Henry F Kaiser in 1958
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iv) Incident Discrimination (analyst experience and automated tools to reduce the 
“noise” of routine events).
TABLE 1- PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
These variables were then grouped together to create a process that for the purposes of the 
model will be called Intelligence Gathering.  Utilising a series of similar reductions using the 
same Varimax process, the rest of the variables were grouped together to create a number of 
functions to form the basis for a new model.  These processes then become:
i) Intelligence Gathering: the gathering of information from relevant sources with the 
appropriate credibility including collaboration information received from partners.
ii) Static Impact Evaluation: the immediate assessment of the relevance of the attack at 
that point in time given the received intelligence and the known confi guration of the 
infrastructure.
iii) Dynamic Risk and Value Assessment (DRVA): the relative values of the “at risk” 
assets from the perspectives of different stakeholders combined with their exposed 
known vulnerabilities and the known attacks.  In this function an intelligence 
value is also calculated for the information that may be gained by responding in an 
“unconventional” manner.  The organisational goals are also taken into account in 
creating this assessment for both the asset and intelligence values.
iv) Modelling: this is the prediction of the future path of the attacks based on known 
attack patterns, attackers, exposed vulnerabilities and asset values.  Combined with 
the output of the DRVA this provides the decision maker with optimal enhanced 
situational awareness.
v) Decision: based on the modelling, the DRVA and the static impact evaluation, 
the responsible decision maker takes the organisational goals into account before 
deciding on a course of action.  They are provided with a number of response options 
(which may be reduced by their legal and organisational constraints): these options 
are:
OS Monitoring
App Monitoring
Hardware Mon
Network Mon
Collaboration In
Collaboration Out
Accuracy
Timeliness
Reliability
Automated Tools
Analyst Experience
Sensors
.85
.72
.71
.69
Collaboration
.87
.83
Credibility
.75
.73
.50
Discrimination
.80
.73
Component
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 a. A conventional response, i.e. defend against the attack via conventional means
   (for example blacklists, IPS, etc).
 b. Passive monitoring response, i.e. observe but show no reaction at all to the
   incident (as though it was undetected) in order to gain intelligence.
 c. Active intelligence gathering, i.e. actively reconnoitre the attacking 
  infrastructure by any means possible in order to gain intelligence but without 
  intentionally causing disruption to the attacking infrastructure.
 d. Cyber strike, neutralise the attacking infrastructure via any available 
  Cyber means.
5. CONCLUSIONS
By analysing the relevant literature it is concluded that the traditional responses to Cyber-
Incidents and the implementation of these models are not meeting the requirements of all 
communities impacted by them.  In order to meet these requirements, not only do responses 
need to be based on the “balance-of-equities” decision between the priorities of the different 
stakeholders whose assets are being attacked, they should also take account of the value of 
intelligence (both local and collaborative) associated with an attack and consider a more fl exible 
suite of response options.  The proposed Dynamic Cyber-Incident Response model enables 
those responsible for cyber-incident response and their key decision-makers to develop a more 
dynamic set of response procedures within their legal and organisational constraints.   That is 
not to say that if a high-value or critical asset is being attacked that it should necessarily be 
allowed to fall in order to gain intelligence; however, if a low value asset is being attacked and 
the attack or attacker is unknown or novel, the organisation might be better served by learning 
about the attack rather than defending the asset.  With this approach, the gained intelligence 
could well help to defend a higher-value asset in the future.
6. FURTHER WORK
The next stages of this work will be to evaluate the survey data and refi ne and develop the 
proposed model.  The intention is evaluate the model in a variety of deployment scenarios 
utilising a purpose-built Cyber Range at the university.  The current evaluation criteria for the 
model are expected to be
i) Assessment of intelligence gains which may be achieved by allowing a predefi ned 
set of cyber incidents to continue under observation.
ii) The contribution of DRVA to the situational awareness of the decision-maker and 
consequent infl uence on their ability to make the optimal decisions.
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